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Abortion remains one of the most hotly debated social and moral issues today. Both the pro-life and pro-choice 
groups present powerful arguments for and 
against abortion. The pro-life group emphasises 
the argument of preserving human life from 
conception at any cost, to the point of giving 
absolute priority to the life of the unborn fetus 
over the life of the mother. The pro-choice group 
emphasises the argument that a woman should 
have the right to control her body to the point of 
absolutising her right over the natural phenomenon 
of the development of a new being. According to 
Peter Singer, the issue of abortion is currently one 
of the most bitterly disputed of all ethical issues. 
The debate has been long-running, and neither side 
has had much success in altering the opinions of its 
opponents.1
This paper explores how the advent of parental 
screening and genetic testing have shifted the focus 
of the abortion debate from a woman’s reproductive 
freedom and her autonomous right to choose, to 
the concept of human dignity, personhood, and the 
fetus’s right to life.
Philosophical Arguments 
on Abortion from the 
Western Perspective
Some of the philosophers on the abortion debate 
propose the following syllogism. First premise: 
It is wrong to take the life of an innocent human 
being intentionally. Second premise: The unborn 
is an innocent human being. Conclusion: It is 
wrong to take the life of the unborn human being 
intentionally.
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امللخ�ض:امراأة م�صلمة حامل يف الأ�صبوع 16 مت اإعالمها باأن فح�ض املوجات فوق ال�صوتية للجنني بنّي وجود ال�صننة امل�صقوقة، والنتائج 
املخربية اأكدت هذا الت�صخي�ض. واأن الطفل �صيعاين من عدة م�صاعفات ويف الأغلب �صيحتاج لعناية طبية مدى احلياة. مبوافقة الزوج مت 
اإقرار اإنهاء احلمل. هذا القرار اأثار جدًل بني علماء الدين يف املجتمع، �رسارة اجلدل كانت بني من هم موافقني على الإجها�ض لأ�صباب 
طبية وبني معار�صني له لأي �صبب. هذه الورقة تقدم عر�ض حلجج وبراهني فل�صفية وطبية عن املعار�صني لالإجها�ض واملنا�رسين له 
وكذلك نظرة الإ�صالم جتاه ا�صتقالل املراأة على جهازها التنا�صلي، حرمة اجلنني، الإجها�ض العالجي و وقت نفخ الروح.
مفتاح الكلمات: معار�صة الإجها�ض، حق احلياة، ال�صتقالل، قد�صية احلياة، اجلنني، امل�صغة، عالقة العقل-اجل�صم، ما وراء الطبيعة، عمان.
abstract: A Muslim woman in her sixteenth week of pregnancy was informed that her ultrasound scan showed 
spina bifida, and laboratory results confirmed the diagnosis. The child would have various complications and, 
most probably, would need medical care for life. With the consent of her husband she decided to terminate the 
pregnancy. Her decision sparked controversy among Muslim clerics in her community, sparking debate between 
those who would allow abortion for medical reasons and those who oppose abortion for any reason. This paper 
will review the philosophical and theological arguments of the pro-life and pro-choice groups as well as the 
Islamic perspective concerning a woman’s autonomy over her reproductive system, the sanctity of the fetus and 
the embryo, therapeutic abortion, and ensoulment.
Keywords: Anti-abortion; Right to life; Autonomy; Sanctity of life; Fetus; Embryo; Mind-Body Relations, 
Metaphysical; Oman.
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Thomson’s paper, A Defense of Abortion, has 
stirred reactions and criticisms from many different 
philosophers and bioethicists from both sides of 
the abortion debate. John Finnis and Patrice Lee 
are among a number of philosophers who rebutted 
Thomson’s thought experiment as flawed and her 
hypothetical cases justifying abortion as lacking 
parallelism to abortion.5,6 First, her opponents 
argued that the principle of respect of autonomy in 
the case of a pregnant woman intending to terminate 
her pregnancy for no medical reasons is in conflict 
with the principles of justice and non-maleficence. 
According to the principle of justice, the fetus is 
denied the right to life. It has the same fundamental 
right as that of a human being after birth. The 
principle of respect of autonomy also contradicts the 
principle of non-maleficence by harming the fetus. 
Hence, in this case, the principles of justice and 
non-maleficence take precedence over the principle 
of respect of autonomy. Second, they argued that 
the hypothetical case of a violinist in justifying 
abortion is not truly analogous to most situations 
in which a woman finds herself pregnant. This is, 
at best, analogous to cases of rape only. Therefore, 
Thomson’s hypothetical case of a woman who woke 
up in the morning to find herself connected to the 
violinist through no fault of hers and without her 
consent fits with a rape case, but not with induced 
abortion for social non-medical reasons. On the 
other hand, Thomson’s proponents praised her 
imaginative examples and controversial conclusions 
in defense of induced abortion. They concede that 
her thought experiments and arguments in support 
of abortion have made her paper the most widely 
reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy.7 
Peter Singer, a controversial, secular, 
philosopher of preference utilitarianism, argues 
that any debate about abortion should be based 
on a utilitarian calculation which weighs the 
preferences of a woman against the preferences 
of the fetus.8 He argues that a fetus, at least up to 
around eighteen weeks, has no capacity to suffer or 
feel satisfaction; hence, it is not possible for such a 
fetus to hold any preferences at all. Based on this 
premise of a utilitarian calculation, there is nothing 
to weigh against a woman's preference to have an 
abortion. Singer concludes that abortion is morally 
permissible.
Don Marquis and Philippa Foot are amongst 
the philosophers who argue that abortion, except 
in rare cases, is seriously immoral.2,3 First, they 
consider the fetus as a potential moral person who 
has the right to life like anyone else, and is entitled 
to protection against homicide. They argue that a 
fetus’ right to life outweighs the mother’s right to 
decide to terminate the pregnancy. 
Second, the fetus and the mother are not the 
only persons involved in the abortion conflict. There 
is also the father who has contributed as much 
genetically to its existence as the mother. Then 
there are the family members and the community 
who have substantial influence and bearing on the 
question of the moral permissibility of abortion. 
Most Western critics for or against abortion 
disregard the importance and the supremacy of 
society and the extended family which, in some 
communities, can be more important than that 
of an individual. If the principle of utilitarianism 
is applied, where the moral worth of an action is 
determined solely by its usefulness in maximising 
utility and minimising negative utility, then abortion 
will not be warranted except in rare cases of serious 
congenital abnormalities or when carrying the 
pregnancy to term would endanger the life of the 
mother.
The abortion-rights campaigners take a liberal 
stand. They argue that the mother has the right 
to decide what will happen to her body. She has 
the right to control the use of her body. This is an 
expression of her autonomy, and she is at liberty 
either to bear the pregnancy to term if she chooses, 
or to have it aborted. These arguments have been 
supported by Judith Thomson who argues that a 
fetus is not yet a person and, even if the fetus were 
to be considered a person, it does not necessarily 
deprive a woman of her right to abortion.4 She 
presented a number of thought experiments to 
argue her case. One of these is the implausible yet 
thought-provoking story of a world famous violinist 
with a fatal kidney ailment who has been attached, 
without her consent and for a term of nine months, 
to a kidnapped woman, as the woman happened 
to be the only one with the blood type that could 
save the life of the violinist. Thomson asks if it 
would be incumbent upon the woman to stay in 
bed with the violinist for nine months in order to 
save him, likening this to a woman’s situation during 
pregnancy. 
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person with rights. The argument of Don Marquis, 
a noted American philosopher, hinges on the 
premise of the ‘future-of-value’ as crucial for the 
right of the fetus not to be killed. Marquis argues 
that the immorality of killing children and adults is 
that killing them will deprive them of their future-
of-value, which includes all things that are good in 
life that they would have experienced had they not 
been killed.10 The same premise holds for the fetus, 
which has enough future-of-value to deserve not to 
be killed.
Patrick Lee, arguing from the premise of 
Aristotelian metaphysics of substances and 
essences, contends that the right to life is an essential 
property of a human being, and this intrinsically 
valuable property begins at conception. Fetuses and 
adult humans are in different phases of an identical 
substance.6 He argues that the development 
phases from zygote to adult human being are 
only quantitative, and not a change of substance. 
The moral status of the fetus is a consequence of 
its essential property or properties. It is wrong to 
kill an unborn human being because she or he is 
identical to an entity which it would be wrong to kill 
at some time later in her or his development. 
Philosophers like Singer, Mary Anne Warren, 
Thomson, and many others consider the argument 
of ‘potentiality’ to be invalid and weak.4,8,11 They 
argue that if the fetus has the potential to become 
a person, then it is not yet a person and we need 
not treat it like one. An acorn has the potential to 
become a large oak tree, but acorns are not oak 
trees. As the Australian philosopher Stanley Benn 
puts it, “A potential president of the United States is 
not on that account commander-in-chief of the U.S. 
Army and Navy”.12
The argument that the fetus has the right to life 
is a reality in life. First, in Islam as well as in the 
world’s communities and governments, people 
recognise that infants have human rights that must 
be respected. In fact, the infants’ rights are held 
in trust until such a time that they are capable of 
exercising them themselves. Second, there is already 
legal precedent for the recognition of personhood 
in those who yet have to develop the ability to 
perform personal acts. Eric T. Olson, an American 
philosopher who specialises in metaphysics and 
philosophy of the mind, argues that personhood 
begins at the moment that an ovum is fertilised by 
the sperm in the uterus to form a zygote, leading 
antenatal screening and 
abortion due to fetal 
abnormalities
The advent of prenatal screening and genetic 
testing has made it possible to predict the risk of 
genetic diseases or disabilities in the developing 
fetus. These technological advances have created 
an ethical and theological dilemma for a number 
of women who initially, willingly, and excitedly 
decided to become pregnant. They then later on 
decided to terminate their late-stage pregnancies 
after detecting unforeseen fatal anomalies during 
a routine antenatal screening. These women argue 
that it is their autonomous right to bear a healthy 
child instead of a deformed child. They are the ones 
who will carry the burden of raising a handicapped 
child if they decide not to abort. Hence, the focus 
of the abortion debate now shifts from a woman’s 
reproductive freedom and her autonomous 
right to choose, to the concept of human dignity, 
personhood, and the right to life.
the concept of human dignity
Daryl Pullman, a prominent Canadian professor of 
medical ethics, examines female infanticide (which 
has become an increasingly common practice in 
obstetric centres globally) in light of the concept of 
human dignity.9 He argues that human beings have 
an innate and inviolable basic dignity which must be 
respected and protected. He argues that people have 
rights because they have dignity. Any human being 
and even other non-persons/non-agents, including 
human gametes, embryos, fetuses, and those who 
are in a state of severe, advanced dementia enjoy a 
prima facie claim of moral consideration simply by 
virtue of their biological connection to the rest of 
the human species. Pullman argues that with this 
concept of human dignity, the fetus should enjoy 
this same legal protection as a newborn baby or 
adult human being and that infanticide is morally 
impermissible.
potential personhood and the 
right to life
One of the most famous and most derided 
arguments against the morality of abortion is the 
argument which says that the fetus has the potential 
to become a person. This argument maintains that 
abortion is morally wrong as it is wrong to kill the 
fetus. If left alone, it has the potential to become a 
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illegal. 
sanctity of the fetus and the 
embryo
Fetal rights in Islam start from the moment of 
conception. If the pregnant mother is attacked and 
the fetus is injured or aborted, then the assailant 
will have to pay al ghurrah, or full diya (blood 
money) depending upon the age of the fetus. The 
al ghurrah blood money is levied as a compensation 
for destroying the fetus in the womb before 
ensoulment. The value of al ghurrah  is 1/10th of the 
full diya blood money of homicide. Once the spirit 
is breathed in after 120 days, the fetus acquires 
perception and volition, (i.e. becomes a person), 
and is entitled to the same rights as a living being. 
In another scenario, a pregnant woman commits 
homicide, and the court has ruled for the death 
penalty. The court order cannot be executed until 
after she gives birth and provisions have been made 
for the newborn baby to be suckled by a wet nurse. 
In a third scenario where the pregnant mother dies 
and there are indications that the fetus is alive in the 
womb, then it is mandatory according to the Shafi’i 
school to dissect the woman to remove the fetus. 
With modern technology, this dissection would be 
in the form of a Caesarean operation, and would 
uphold the fetus’s right to life. Further, the fetus has 
also full rights of inheritance. If the husband dies 
while his wife is pregnant, the disposal of his estate 
cannot be inherited by testators until the pregnancy 
is brought to term and the baby’s share is allocated. 
This demonstrates the sharia’s consideration for the 
fetus’s right of inheritance. Finally, in the case of 
miscarriage or abortion, the fetus is given full burial 
rights including prayers for the dead. But if the fetus 
is less than 4 months old, it is granted all the burial 
rights of the dead person, except that prayers for the 
dead are not offered.
therapeutic abortion
Many jurists, including the Muslim World League 
Fiqh Council, allow abortion prior to 120 days 
of pregnancy if the fetus is grossly malformed, 
the ailment cannot be treated, and both parents 
have agreed to the procedure.16,17 Abortion after 
ensoulment is strictly forbidden by all authorities, 
but the vast majority do make an exception to 
preserve the mother's life. If a choice has to be made 
to save either the fetus or the mother, but not both, 
to the formation of a blastocyst. Olson holds that 
the continuous existence of a human biological 
organism from the blastocyst stage is necessary and 
sufficient for personhood.13
Philosophical Arguments 
on Abortion from the 
Islamic Perspective 
The case of the Muslim woman who terminated 
her pregnancy raises four issues: 1) a woman’s 
autonomy over her reproductive system in Islam; 
2) the sanctity of the fetus and the embryo; 3) 
therapeutic abortion; 4) the ensoulment period.
the issue of women’s autonomy 
over her reproductive system
Islam holds high the principal of respect of 
autonomy. The rule of autonomy entails a competent 
major who can decide for him/herself what is best 
for him/her. If an adult competent patient has no 
desire to eat, it is improper to provide him/her 
with food. The Prophet said, “Do not force your 
sick to eat or drink”.14 Abu-Bakr Siddiq, the first 
caliph of Islam, and Muadh ibn Jabal were among 
the eminent companions of the Prophet who 
exercised their Principle of Respect of Autonomy 
by refusing therapy at their last illness as they felt 
it would be futile to receive treatment. An adult 
patient is free to choose loyalties or a system of 
religious belief. The Qur’an is explicit in this issue: 
“No compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear 
from error”.15 It is clear that an ailing person who 
is mentally competent should have full control over 
consent to his/her medical treatment. However, the 
concept that individuals have unlimited autonomy 
with respect to their reproductive systems, as long 
as they do not breach the autonomy of others, is 
unacceptable in Islam. In the case of abortion for 
social reasons, Islamic sharia gives priority to the 
principle of justice over the principle of autonomy. 
The fetus and the embryo have the right to life and 
the same fundamental right as that of a human 
being after birth. The principle of respect of 
autonomy in this case also contradicts the principle 
of non-maleficence by harming the fetus. Hence, in 
the scenario of the abortion for other than medical 
reasons case, the principles of justice and  non-
maleficence take precedence over the principle of 
respect of autonomy, and abortion is considered 
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perception and volition i.e. becomes a person”.27 
Therefore, abortion with no medical reasons is a 
crime in Islam, and “the degree of crime”, affirmed 
Imam Ghazali, “increases from phase to phase. The 
first stage is when the sperm in the uterus mixes 
with the woman’s fluid (ova) and becomes ready to 
receive life. Destroying it (i.e. the zygote) is a crime. 
The crime becomes more serious when aborting 
the alaqa or mudh’gha (clot).3,4 The degree of crime 
becomes even more serious when aborting the 
fetus after ensoulment or before its birth (as it is 
considered homicide)”.28 
Conclusion
A moral answer concerning the abortion issue is 
not simple. A response to the abortion issue should 
be a dynamic and rich dialogue between different 
classes of our society, one in which political  terms 
are avoided. It has become a chronic tendency for 
proponents and opponents of abortion to show 
their own philosophical arguments in the best 
possible light, while at the same time describing 
their opponents in the worst possible light. For 
example, those who oppose abortion would refer to 
those who hold the alternative view as pro-death and 
call themselves pro-life, while those who support 
abortion say their opponents are anti-choice and 
refer to themselves as pro-choice. Secondly, most of 
the philosophers and ethicists on both sides of the 
debate fail to acknowledge that the abortion debate 
is of religious or philosophical nature. Our ideas 
about life, ensoulment, personhood, and the value 
of the human being are shaped by various religious 
and philosophical influences. It is unfortunate to 
see some secular humanists viewing religions as 
superstitions, repressive, or close-minded.
In conclusion, there is bad news and good news 
as far as the abortion debate is concerned. The 
bad news is that the controversies and conflicts 
are far from over. However, the good news is that, 
irrespective of all hurdles, as affirmed by Peter 
Singer, both sides can reach a level of understanding 
and respect of one another’s opinions if both 
sides—both pro-life and pro-choice—show good 
will and work together for a common good and 
take a rational and moral stand, avoiding labels and 
rhetoric.
then the mother's life would take precedence. She is 
seen as the root and the fetus as an offshoot.18 In the 
case of rape, a number of jurists would also allow 
abortion during the first 40 days computed from 
fertilisation.19,20  
the ensoulment period
Ensoulment refers to the moment the human being 
gains a soul. The teachings of Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam affirm that what makes one a person with 
full moral rights is the possession of the soul, and 
they apply the moment of ensoulment as the cut-off 
point in determining legislation on abortion. There 
are two theories regarding the period of ensoulment: 
immediate or delayed ensoulment. According 
to the immmediate ensoulment theory, the soul 
begins to exist at conception, when the sperm 
fuses with the ovum. Professor Jones produced a 
wealth of historical scholarship to prove that the 
belief in delayed ensoulment among mediaeval 
Western Christians was founded on mistranslation 
of scriptures and on an outmoded embryology.21 
The delayed ensoulment theory dates back to the 
time of Aristotle, who argued that ensoulment for 
males is 40 days and 90 days for females.22 Thomas 
Aquinas was among the Christian philosophers 
who affirmed delayed ensoulment.21 The view of 
allowing abortion prior to the ensoulment period 
was practised in the USA in the 19th century, 
when abortion was generally regarded as morally 
acceptable during the first trimester of pregnancy 
on the grounds that the fetus had not yet acquired 
a soul.23
The Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad declared the ensoulment period to 
be  about 120 days (4 lunar months plus 10 days) 
computed from the moment of  conception, which 
is equivalent to 19 weeks and one day, or 134 days 
from a woman’s last menstrual period.17,24–26 Prior 
to this period, the human embryo has sanctity 
which gradually increases with its development. 
It is considered as a person after ensoulment. Ibn 
Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah, an eminent Muslim jurist, 
has this to say regarding different stages of the 
embryo in the uterus: “The embryo and the fetus 
before ensoulment has the life of growth and 
nourishment like that of the plant. Its movement 
and perception is not voluntary. But once the 
spirit is breathed unto the fetus, the movement 
and perception becomes voluntary, thus acquiring 
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